## Weekly National Intelligencer.

WASHINGTON: THURSDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1864.

## Weekly National Intelligencer.

BY GALES & SEATON.

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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1864.

MR LINCOLN'S RECORD .- No. I.

In the month of February last, when the per sonal friends and office-holders of President LIN COLN began to agitate for his re-nomination by the Republican party, Mr. HORACE GREELEY, the editor of the New York Tribune, in a public appeal against the expediency of such a step, wrote as follows :

"Shall we renominate Mr. Lincoln, and endeavor to produce, so far as may be, 1860 in 1864? My judgment in dicates a different policy, a different purpose. I do not believe that the course which a true, intelligent regard for the President's own happiness and fame would pre-scribe . . . . Were he now to announce his per-emptory withdrawal from public life on the 4th of March, 1865, the closing year of his Presidential term would be one of the proudest and happiest of his life. . . . . Bu
let him be a candidate for re-nomination and re-elec tion, and all this will be sadly different. The disas ters, the burdens, the debts, the hopes deferred of the last three years unt all be revived to his prejudice, and pa raded before the public eye to his injury. It wil be in sisted, so long as it can be without too ready coofu tat on that his re electron implies a repetition of all that was unfortunate and discreditable in the recent history of our coun try, with interminable war and immeasurable debt. The facts that Jackson and Clay alike condemned the re-election of a President in office, that both parties have assert non of a President in office, that both parties have asserted the correctness of the ore-term principle, that no President has for thirty years been re-elected, though several
have sought to be, will all be considered to his disadvan
tage; the popular belief that the re-election of a President involves the retention in office of the great mass of
his appointees—every thing would work against h m."

Such were the public considerations which in duced this warm political triend of the President to oppose his re-nomination, with the possible contingency of thereby perpetuating for four years more "the disasters, the burdens, the debts, and the hopes deferred," which have marked his Ad ministration of the Government during the pre sent term. "Every thing," says Mr. Greeley, " would work against him." It is impossible to find terms more expressive in which to convey the writer's sense of Mr. Lincoln's want of qualification for the high office to which he was raised four gears ago, and to which he again aspires by favor of the Baltimore Republican Convention.

Now that he has been placed in re-nomination before the people, notwithstanding his repeated the reluctance of a large part of his political friends to see him in that attitude, it becomes our duty to investigate with candor the claims on which he challenges the popular suffrages, that we may see how far Mr. Greeley was right when he identified his past Administration of the Government with "disasters, burdens, debts, and hopes deferred." And to this end we propose to take a review of the military and civil career of President Lincoln during the last three years and a half, that the people may judge whether, in the idea of Mr. Greeley, it would be expedient and wise "to reroduce 1860 in 1864." We commence with his Military Record.

The Hon. Henry J. Raymond, the editor of the New York Times, and the bicgrapher of Mr. Lincoln. thus refers in his "History of the Administration of President Lincoln" to what he calls the President's military experience. We quote from the 18th page of the volume, where Mr. Raymond

"When the Black Hawk war broke out in 1842 Lincoln joined a volunteer company and was made est tain. He was an efficient, faithful officer, watchful of h men, and prompt in the discharge of duty, and his courage and patriotism shrank from no dangers and hardships Thus the commander in chief of our armies has not been without his bit of military experience—much more, in fact, than the most of our brigadier generals had had be fore the commencement of the war.

As Mr. Lincoln's biographer appears to lay much stress upon this military experience of the President qualifying him to fill the responsible post of commander-in-chief of the armies of the Union at the present time, when a million of men are in the field, we are sure that the reader would like to see Mr. Lincoln's own estimate of the milibiographer. Accordingly, we quote from a speech delivered by Mr. LINCOLN in the House of Reprementatives on the 27th of July, 1848, as found in the Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 1st Sesmion of 30th Congress, page 1,042. We infer from it that Mr. Raymond magnifies the position of Mr. Lincoln in the Black Hawk war, as it seems that he carried a musket and not a sword in that campaign. Mr. Lincoln said :

By the way, Mr. Speaker, did you know that I am Yes, sir, in the days of the Black Hawk military nero? I ce, sit, in the days of the Black Hawk war, I fought, bled, and came away. Speaking of Gen. Casa's carrer reminds me of my own. I was not at Still-man's defeat, but I was about as near it as Cass was to Hull's surrender; and like him I saw the place soon afterwards. It is quite certain that I did not break my sword, for I had none to break; but I bent a musket pretty badly on one occasion. If Cass broke his sword, the idea is, h broke it in desperation; I bent the musket by seci dent. If Gen. Cass went in advance of me in picking whortleberries, I guess I surpassed him in charges upon the wild onions. If he saw any live fighting Indians it whoreleasties, if he saw any live fighting Indians it was more team I did, but I had a good many bloody strug-gles with the musquitoes; and, although I never fainted from less of blood, I can truly say I was often very nogry. Mr. Speaker, if I should ever conclude to doff what-rer our Democratic friends may suppose there is of black ockage Federalism about me, and thereupon they shall take me up as their candidate for the Presidency, I protest they shall not make fun of me, as they have of Gen. Cass. by attempting to write me into a military hero."

As it is not the Democrats but the Republicans who have committed the imprudence of first taking up Mr. Lincoln as their candidate for the Presidency, and of now writing him into a military hero on the strength of his experience in the Black Howk war, we hope that in respect for his protest they will equally have a care not to "make fan" of him on a subject as to which in 1848 he seemed to be particularly sensitive, though not unwilling to "make fun" of himself.

Sometimes, however, it is a sad thing for a na- the population. Surely each man has as strong a motive tion to have as its commander-in-chief a man who "makes fun" of very serious things. And in the beginning of the civil troubles which have since darkened and desolated our land, it is known that Mr. Lincoln, then the President elect of the nation, could see in the premonitions of a great popular convulsion nothing but signs of an "artificial crisis." On his way to Washington, when seven States had proclaimed themselves, through their Conventions, "out of the Union," and when all the national forts located within their bounds were seized and held by a disaffected and insurgent population, with the single exception of Forts Sumter and Pickens. he proclaimed in jocular tones that "nobody was hurt," and that all the excitement which had been raised "down South" was nothing more than such a crisis as might be gotten up at any time by tur bulent men aided by designing politicians. To this effect he spoke at several points on his way from Springfield to Washington. We will cite but a single instance or two, selecting in the first place from the remarks made by Mr. Lincoln at Pitts burgh, in Pennsylvania, on the 15th of February, 1861. We quote from Mr. Raymond's biography,

p. 85: "Notwithstanding the troubles across the river [the speaker pointed southwardly across the Monongahela and smiled ] there is no crisis but an artificial one. What is there to warrant the condition of affairs presented by our friends over the river? Take even their view of the ques tions involved, and there is nothing to justify the course they are pursuing. I repeat, then, there is no crisis ex-cepting such a one as may be gotten up at any time by tur-buient men, aided by designing politicians."

To the same effect he speke on the 15th of Feb ruary, in Cleveland, Ohio, as follows:

"Why all this excitement? Why are these complaints As I said before, this crisis is all art ficial. It has no founds tion in fact. It was not 'argued up,' and, as the saying is. it cannot be argued down. Let it alone and it will go done

Such was the festive speech and such was the prescience with which President Lincoln acceded to the Presidential chair, at a time when the hearts of good men and sagacious patriots were failing them for fear of the things to come on the land.

did Mr. Lincoln do in order to assuage the "artificial" excitement at the South? He had said at Cleveland that "if we would let it alone it would go down of itself;" and many who were very far through which they have passed Whether to accomplish from concurring with him in the opinion that the 'crisis' was an artificial one believed that this was the best mode of treating it.

A week or two after the inauguration of Mr Lincoln it was authoritatively "given out" that this "let alone" policy would be pursued by the Administration in regard to the insurgent States, and that, in order to avoid all occasion of offence, our garrison would be withdrawn from Fort Sum.

ter, the only point of irritating contact in the South A formula of forces is permitted to continue through many months, a rebellion, which might have been crushed by one prompt battle, widens into war south A formula of forces is permitted to continue through many months, a rebellion, which might have been crushed by one prompt battle, widens into war south A formula of forces is permitted to continue through many months, a rebellion, which might have been crushed by one prompt battle, widens into war south a force of the continue through many months, a rebellion, which might have been crushed by one prompt battle, widens into war south a force of the continue through many months, a rebellion, which might have been crushed by one prompt battle, widens into war south a force of the continue through many months, a rebellion, which might have been crushed by one prompt battle, widens into war south a force of the continue through many months, a rebellion, which might have been crushed by one prompt battle, widens into war so that the continue through many months, a result of the continue through the c pledges to decline a re-election, and notwithstanding our garrison would be withdrawn from Fort Sum. South. A few weeks later Mr. Lincoln, acting under what "pressure" we are not able to say, re- case with the most of the Tribune's theories, it was considered this determination and dispatched an wrongly applied to the facts of the case. Presumexpedition to Charleston harbor for the purpose ing that 75,000 three months' men were quite able of reinforcing Major Anderson, peaceably if allow- to bring on a single "short and sharp but thoed, if not by force. The expedition was placed rough" collision which would end the rebellion, under the command of Capt. Fox, the present the Tribune began at once to raise the cry of "on energetic Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

dition, which, though it failed to reinforce Fort for an offensive movement, but the more he resist-Sumter, gave to the insurgents just the pretext ed the more vehemently did the Tribune shout they wanted for lighting up the flames of civil "on to Richmond." Such was the phrenzy raised the expedition failed through the neglect of the such the effect of its reflex action on an Administhe expedition. On this point we have to cite the Scott both yielded, and the battle of Bull Run following extract from a letter addressed by the President to that gentleman, under date of May the clamors of the Tribune. It was the first fruits 1st, 1861. (See Report of the Secretary of the Navy in relation to armed vessels, p. 607:)

"WASHINGTON, MAY 1, 1861. "MY DEAR SIR: I sincerely regret that the failure of the late attempt to provision Fort Sumter should be the source of any annoyance to you. The practicability of Run the New York Tim your plan was not, in fact, brought to test. By reason of 1861, wrote as follows: a gale, well known in advance to be possible and not im probable, the tugs, an essential part of the plan, never were in no wise responsible, and possibly I to some extent was, you were deprived of a war vessel with her men, which ou desmed of great importance to the enterprise.'

Thus, by the violence of the insurgents on the one hand, and by the departure of the President from his promised "let alone" policy on the other, the nation was plunged into civil war. Whether tary experience so highly prized by his admiring the crisis was an "artificial" one may be read in the President and Cabinet in any responsibility that does the scenes which have ensued since that fatal 12th not belong to them; but, on the other band, we do not in of April, 1861, when the attack on Fort Sumter which were done by others. We know that Gen. Scott became the signal for which the zealots on both ning; he deemed it unwise to make Richmond the main sides were waiting in their cagerness to begin the point of the movement; but after that had been decided dreadful fray. Whether the President "under- against him, he was opposed to marching against it by the stood his epoch" may be read in all that he said foot of which would be obstinately defended, and before the conflict was precipitated, as it may be seen in what he has done since the bloody issue such disclosures, we shall not besitate to state the authorwas joined.

The nation sprang to arms at his summons, contained in his proclamation of April 15, 1861, calling for 75,000 men for three months. He tinct and well defined opinion on every point connected judged this force sufficient to defend the national judged this force sufficient to defend the national capital, and to recover the national property seized by the insurgents in the Seceded States, to which by the insurgents in the Seceded States, to which latter task be announced its first efforts would be loyalty. And this must be done with the least possible directed. We need not say that it never engaged expenditure of live, compatible with the attainment directed. We need not say that it never engaged object. No Christian nation can be justified, he said, in this enterprise, as the President had so miscal- waging war in such a way as shall destroy five hundred culated the nature of the "artificial crisis" that he was compelled to retain nearly the whole of the unmber absolutely required is murdered. Hence, he locked upon all shooting of pickets, all scouting forays not required in order to advance the general object of the war,

When Congress met in extraordinary session on the 4th of July, 1861, he recommended as fol-

"It is now recommended that you give the legal means of or making this contest a short and a decisive one; that P you place at the control of the Government for the work at sive operations. The summer months, during which it is least four hundred thousand men and four hundred miltions of dollars. That number of men is about one tenth of those of proper ages within the region where apparent-ly all are willing to engage; and the sum is less than a twenty-third part of the money value owned by the men who seem ready to devote the whole. A debt of siz hun dred millions of dollars now is a less sum per head than

now to preserve our liberties as each had then to establish them.

"A right result at this time will be worth more to the world than ten times the men and ten times the money. The evidence reaching us from the country leaves no doubt that the material for the work is abundant, and that it needs only the hand of baillation to give it lead sengting. needs only the hand of legislation to give it legal sanction and the hand of the Executive to give it practical shape and efficiency One of the greatest perplexities of the Gov ernment is to avoid receiving troops faster than it can pro-vide for them. In a word, the people will save their Gov-ernment if the Government itself will do its part only ndifferently well.

Such was Mr. Lincoln's estimate of the " crisis' when, ceasing to be "artificial," it had passed, in July, 1861, into an armed sedition, threatening the safety of the national capital, and drawing the safety of the safety of the national capital, and drawing the safety of the eleven States in its train. If four hundred thousand men and four hundred million dollars were placed at the control of the Government the contest would be "short and decisive!" And such was then the martial and patriotic spirit of the people that one of the greatest perplexities of the Government was to avoid receiving troops faster than it could provide for them. Well might Mr. Lincoln say that "the people would save their Government, if the Government itself would do its part indifferently well;"- and as the Government is not yet saved, after two millions of men have been put in the field for three years, and of er a debt of more than two thousand millions has been contracted, it is only just to infer, according to Mr. Lincoln's own admission, that the Government has NOT done its part even indifferently well.

## MR. LINCOLN'S RECORD -No. II.

In a few weeks after the opening of the conflict precipitated by the bombardment of Fort Sumter, the New York Tribune, which thus early showed itself to be the power behind the President stronger than the President himself, demanded that "the war should be closed in triumph within one year from the time it was commenced." These were the words it held on the 19th of June, 1861:

"On the advent of the next spring peace should asser Safely installed in the Executive Mansion, what resume their accustomed channels; learning, genius, and virtue should once more pursue the even tenor of their way; and our civil institutions, restored to their firm foun ations, should receive more than the wonted regard and this end, ere another hot sees in opens upon us, will require half a million of men, and five hundred millions of money.

In the same article it said :

"In subduing a revolt, if a Government allows the con test to become an equal one between the loyal forces and the insurgents, what would otherwise have termina ed in a single short, sharp, but thorough and final collision, expands into the proportions of a campaign, with its skir-mishes and sieges, and their alternating reverses and tri umphs. And, if this equilibrium of forces is permitted to

This theory was entirely correct, but, as in the to Richmond" Gen. Scott resisted, knowing the We all know what was the upshot of this expe- want of preparation on the part of our authorities war. But perhaps it is not generally known that by the cuckoo-cry throughout the country, and President to furnish to Capt. Fox the co-operation tration which takes its impulse from external "presof a war vessel, which he had made a condition of sure," that, in the end, the President and Gen was fought on Sunday, July 21, 1861, to appease of the "pressure" which has since brought forth other fruits after its kind, in the shape of civil and military disaster.

Five days after the disaster and rout of Bull Run the New York Times in its issue of July 26.

"The question is, who decided that the attack should be Who determined that the road to Richmond should be by Manascas Junction? Who is responsible for the plan of operations by which a battle at this point, se lected by the rebels themselves, admirably adapted for de fence, fort fied through three long months of incresant labor, accessible to their reinforcements from both directions, and in all respects precisely such a position as they might wish to make it, became a matter of necessity? Th paragraph quoted above, for the purpose of relieving the President and Cabinet, throws the responsibility upon Gen. Scott. We have not the slightest desire to involve tend that Gen. Scott shall be loaded with blame for acts longest and most difficult route, through a country every

ity for it. It is that of Gen. Scott himself. "On the Tuesday preceding the battle, Gen. Scott, at his own table, in presence of his aids and a single guest, discussed the whole subject of this war, in all its parts, and tinct and well defined opinion on every point connected with it; and stated what his pl n would be for bringing it to at a cost of five bundred. Every man killed beyond the il destruction of life, on either side, which did not contribute to the general result, as so many acts of unjustifia

"If the matter had been left to him, he said, he would have commenced by a perfect blockade of every Southern port on the Atlantic and the Gulf. Then he collected a large force at the Capital for defensive pur poses, and another large one on the Mississippi for offen been devoted to tactical instruction; and, with the first frosts of autumn, he would have taken a column of 80,000 well-disciplined troops down the Mississippi, and taken every important point on that river. New Orleans included. It could have been done, he said, with greater ease, with less loss of life, and with far more important results than would was the debt of our Revolution when we came out of that attend the marching of an army to Richmond. At eight struggle; and the money value in the country now bears points the river would probably have been defended, and even a greater proportion to what it was then than does eight battles would have been necessary; but in every one McClellan.

of them success could have been made certain for us. The Mississippi and the Atlantic once ours, the Southern States would have been compelled, by the natural and inevitable pressure of events, to seek, by a return to the Union, escape from the ruin that would speedily overwhelm them out of it 'This,' said he, 'was my plan. But I am only a subordinate. It is my business to give advice when it is asked and to obey orders when they ar given. I shall do it. There are geotlemen in the Cabine who know much more about war than I do, and who hav far greater influence than I have in determining the plaof the campaign. There never was a more just and up-right man than the President—never one who desired more sincerely to promote the best interest of the country. But there are men among his advisers who consult then But I know perfectly well that they have no conception of the difficulties we shall encounter. I know th country-how admirably adapted it is to defence, and how resolutely and obstinately it will be defended. I would like nothing better than to take Richmond. Now that it has been disgraced by becoming the capital of the rebel Confederacy, I teel a resentment towards it, and should like nothing better than to scatter its Congress to the winds. But I have lived long enough to know that human resentment is a very bad foundation for a public policy; and these gentlemen will live long enough to learn it also. I shall do what I am ordered. I shall fight when and where I am commanded. But if I am compelled to fight before I am ready, they ohall not hold me responsible. These gentlemen must take the responsibility of their acts as I am willing to take that of mine. But they must not throw their responsibility on my shoulders."

Such were the plans of Gen. Scott. How they were overruled the Times proceeded to explain in the same article by saying that the President, in such a matter as fighting battles on which the fate of the country hung, was to a very great extent in the hands of his Cabinet. It said :

" President Lincoln is not likely, of his own motion, to have overruled Gen. Scott and to have forced him to fight a battle against his will. But President Lincoln is, to a very great extent, in such a matter as this, in the hands of his Cabinet. A portion of that Cabinet is known to have full and entire confidence in the military ability of Gen. Scott; while another portion is equally well known to be governed by sentiments of personal dalike which amount almost to hatred. It is not necessary to specify individuals It is a matter of notoriety that some members of the Cabinet have dens little else during the last few weeks than to denounce Gen. Scott, ridicule his plans of the campaign, and declaim on the necessity of overruling or superseding him. I hey have succeeded in overruling him

with what results the country knows too well.

"Let the President make up his own mind on this point, and then make his Cabinet a unit upon it. It experience and science in military matters are to bear sway, let it be undisputed. Let them have full possession of the Government, and take all the responsibility of its ruin. If not, let them retire and give place to men of cooler temper and of wiser heads. The worst thing the President can do in this crisis is to hesitate and alloy things to drift at random, as they are now doing

Here, then, we have, in the untoward result the "collision" precipitated by the Tribune on the 21st of July, 1861, the origin of a contest which has expanded not only into "the proportion of a campaign," but into the proportion of four successive campaigns, without as yet any end being reached. The very means taken by the Administration at second-hand from the New York journal for the purpose of " crushing the rebellion by one prompt battle" caused the struggle to "widen into war on a gigantic scale." Gen. McClellan, at the advice of Gen. Scott, was called from his victorious the Republic, imperilled and lost by partisan folly note: on the field of Bull Run. He first addressed himorder out of the chaos created by the late rout, began the construction of those works which have since proved the sure defence of our city against the approach of the enemy, and against his ingress when by military shiftlessness he has been allowed to approach our very gates, as in July last. Had it not been for these much derided works, the city of Washington would have then fallen an easy prey to a single detachment of Gen. Early's army.

On the 31st of October, 1861, Gen. Scott resigned his chief command of the armies of the Union. Gen. McClellan was called by the President to succeed. In his ensuing annual message to Congress Mr. Lincoln thus referred to the considerations which dictated this choice

" With the retirement of Gen. Scott came the Executive duty of appointing, in his stead, a General in-Chief of the army. It is a fortunate circumstance that neither in coun cil nor country was there, so far as I know, any difference of opinion as to the proper person to be selected. The retiring chief repeatedly expressed his judgment in favor of Gen. McClellan for the position; and in this the nation seemed to give a unanimous concurrence. The designs tien of Gen. McClellan is, therefore, in considerable gree, the selection of the country as well as of the Executive; and hence there is better reason to hope there w be given him the confidence and cordial support thus, by implication, promised, and without which he cannot with so full efficiency, serve the country.

"It has been said that one bad general is better tha two good ones; and the saying is true, if taken to mean no more than that an army is better directed by a single mind though inferior, than by two superior ones at variance and cross-purposes with each other.

And so, on the 1st of November, 1861, General McClellan became the General-in-Chief of the Armics of the United States. He seemed to have and we think that he really had, the confidence and the support of the President until the latter could no longer withstand the " pressure" brought to bear against Gen. McClellan and himself. For, while McClellan was organizing his armies, the same turbulent faction which had goaded the President into fighting the battle of Bull Run before he was ready, became now still more vociferous in its outcries against Gen. McClellan's "delays" The last injunction of Gen. Scott to the young General-in-Chief had been "never permit any power on earth to make you deviate from your well-conceived plans," and the political strategists soon found that Gen. McClellan was not a man to be moved from his steadfastness. Hence the violence of their clamor dered : against him. A joint committee of both Houses of Congress was taised to preside over the "conduct of the war," and it most assiduously performed its function by doing all in its power to destroy the confidence of the people and to weaken the faith of the President in Gen. McClellan. The "loyal" maxim which inculcates the duty of upholding the hands of those who bear aloft the banner of the Republic had not then been invented. It was reserved for the benefit of Generals of another political mould. "The same radical contempers of experience and science in military affairs" who had pestered and vilified General Scott

Acting under the influence of these "radical henceforth governed in all their movements by contemners of experience and science in military an authority other than that of Gen. McClellan, affairs," the President issued an order on the 27th whether by the President directly or indirectly of January, 1862, commanding that "the 22d of through the Secretary of War it is needless to in-February, 1862, should be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the Uni- in contemplation of law and of constitutional reted States against the insurgent forces." The President seems to have assumed that the anni- States. versary of the birthday of Washington would be a good day for commencing military operations. All considerations of weather and of the condition of the roads at that season of the year were left out the Rappahannock and of the Shenandoah Valley of account. (In the following years the same ar- proved to be most unfortunate and ill-advised. my, under the command successively of Hooker Whether from the inherent infelicity of such an and of Grant, did not begin to move until the arrangement, or from the little wisdom with which month of May.)

On the 31st of January, 1862, the President ordered "that all the disposable forces of the Army of the Potomac, after providing for the safety of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwest of Manassas Junction.'

On the 2d of February, drawing, we presume on what Mr. Raymond calls his "military experience" in the Black Hawk war, the President wrote to Gen. McClellan as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, February 2, 1862.
Major General McClellan—My Dear Sir: You and Major General McULFLLAN—My Dear Sir: Fou and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomec. Yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across and to the terminus of the railroad on the York river; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Ma-

It you will give me satisfactory answers to the followin uestions I shall gladly yield my plan to yours : 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine? 2d Wherein is victory more certain by your plan than mine? 31. Where in is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine? 41 In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would? 5th. In case of disaster, would not a re treat be me e difficult by your plan than mine?

Yours, truly,

On the 8th of March, 1862, the President or dered Gen. McClellan to organize that part of hi army destined for active operations into four arm corps, under Gens. McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes; and ordered further that Gen. Wadsworth take command of the forces left for the defence of Washington.

On March 11th, by order of the President, Gen McClelian was relieved of command of all the army except the "Department of the Potomac," and the Mountain Department was created for Gen. Fremont, and a large division of McClellan's army was taken away from him to be placed under Fremont's command. This was the first change in the General's plan

Just as Gen. McClellan was about embarking fo Fortress Monroe, having previously sent his army thither, he received the following note from Mr Lincoln, written, it will be seen, under a "pres sure," notwithstanding the latter had, a few days career in West Virginia to retrieve the fortunes of before, promised not to do what was ordered in the

EXECUTIVE MANSION.

Major General McCLELLAN. MY DEAR SIR: This morning I felt constrained to orde Blocker's division to Fremont; and I will write this to meure you that I do so with great pain, und-retanding the you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full PRESSURE of the case I am convinced you would justify it. even beyond a mere acknowled, ment that the commanue n-chief may order what he pleases.

It was under such omens that Gen. McClellan proceeded to the Virginia Peninsula.

Before he left Washington an order had been issued by the War Department placing Fort Monroe and its dependencies under his control, and authorizing him to draw from the troops under Gen. Wool a division of about ten thousand men, which was to be assigned to the First Corps. During the night of the 3d of April he received a telegram from the adjutant general of the army, stating that, by the President's order, he was deprived of all control over Gen. Wool and the troops under his command, and forbidden to detach any of that General's troops without his sanction.

This order left Gen. McClellan without any base of operations under his own control.

It was a part of Gen. McClellan's plan to us McDowell's corps for a flank movement, which would have made the immediate evacuation of York town a necessity, even if did not enable him to capture the enemy there. While under fire before Yorktown he received the intelligence that McDow ell was ordered to remain before Washington.

This was done on the 4th of April. Th troops composing the advance of each column were, during the afternoon of that day, under warm actillery fire-the sharpshooters even of the right column being engaged, when covering reconnoissances. It was at this stage and moment of the campaign that the following telegram was sent to Gen. McClellan :

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, APRIL 4, 1862. McDowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate command, and the General is to report to the Secretary of War; letter by mail.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant General.

such malign auspices? It was at this same date that the following change in the Military Departments in Virginia was or-

" First. That that portion of Virginia and Maryland lying between the Mountain Lepartment and the plue Ridge shall constitute a Military Department, to be called the Department of the Shenandosh, and be under the command Mosor General Banks.

Second That that portion of Virginia east of the Blue Ridge and west of the Potomac and the Fredericksburg and Richmord railroad (including the Department of the District of Columbia and the country between the Poomac and Patuxent) shall be a military district, to be called e Department of the Rappahannock, and be under the command of Major General Mc Dowell

By this regulation the former Military Department of Gen. McClellan was subdivided into three distinct and independent districts, and the forces formerly subject to his orders were subdivided into three distinct and independent commands, of which he had the most important, but the com-

quire, since all acts of an executive character are, sponsibility, the acts of the President of the United

We need not pause to demonstrate that the regulation by which the Administration constituted the two separate and independent departments of these two departments were directed from Washington, certain it is that nothing but failure and disaster attended the operations of our armies in both these military districts.

Though Gen. McDowell was thus removed from the command of Gen. McClellan, an order was sent from Washington directing Gen. McClellan to extend his right wing to the north of Richmond until McDowell could effect a junction with it via Fredericksburg, under direction of the President. The order to this effect, under date of May 18, 1861, was as follows :

"Gen. McDowell is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the Capital from all possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond. It is believed that this communication can be safely established, either north or south of the Pamunkey river In any event, you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemy's orces from leaving Richmond and falling in overwhelming force upon Gen. McDowell He will move with between thirty five and forty thousand men.

In order to swell the column of Gen. McDowall the column of Gen. Banks in the valley of the Shenandoah was reduced to a mere handful, and an opportunity was thus created for that incursion of Jackson which broke up all the military o mbinations formed by the Administration for the reinf reement of Gen. McClellan, while the Shenardosh Valley thereupon became the theatre on which a medley of commands, all moving under orders from Washington at cross lines and equally cross purposes, succeeded in nothing except to convince the Administration that its military subdivisions had proved exceedingly unfortunate. And, as if to make expiation for the mistake, the three departments of Gen. Fremont, of Gen. Banks, and of Gen. McDowell were suddenly, by order of the President, merged into one. The unity of command which had been disturbed by the order of April 4th was thus partially restored by the order which announced, on the 26th of June, the consolidation of the armies of Gens. Fremont, Banks, and McDowell into a single army under command of Major Gen. Pope.

But in the mean time, by the opportunity offered for Jackson's foray and by the panie which the foray created in official quarters, all thought of reinforcing Gen. McClellan had been postponed for the capture of the rebel force which had introduced this disturbing element into the military calculations of the Administration. Gen. McDowell was turned from his proposed march in the direction of Richmond to join in the "chase" of Jackson, who succeeded not only in cluding his pursuers, but who was so inefficiently followed by those 'pursuers" that while entrenchments were being thrown up against him in the valley of the Shenandoah he hurled his entire force against the column of Gen. McClellan at Richmond, already called to cope with an enemy believed to be largely superior in numbers before Gen. Lee had received this sudden accession.

For this failure of the campaign our military authorities in Washington were directly responsible. No blame in the premises was imputed by them to Gen. McClellan, and the President, equally desirous to exonerate himself from censure, agcribed the untoward result to "the nature of the

Reviewing the whole campaign in its number of July 7, 1862, the editor of the New York Times, with all the facts then before him, wrote as follows. The article is interesting because it was published at a time when that journal had no partisan purpose to subserve, as it now has, by the defamation of Gen. McClellan. It then said : "It is very easy, now that the affair is over, to perceive

the cause of McClellan's recent reverse. At the last no ment, when least expected, and equally to the surprise, we have no doubt, of President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton, and Gen. McClellan himself, Stonewall Jackson rushed from the Valley of the Shenandonb, attacked with 50,000 men our right wing of 20,000, forced it back and got in rear of our whole army, without weakening the rebel force massed in front of it by a single man. No General on earth could make head against such a coup de guerre. If McClellan had stood his ground and fought in such a position, nothing in the world could have prevented the utter annihilation of the Army of the Potomac. That he saved the army against such olds and under such circumstances, and that he has been able to place it upon a new base of operations from which he may renew his attack upon the rebel capital with increased changes of success, Did ever a General enter on a campaign under effords such proof of consummate generalship as few tiving soldiers can show.

"Gen. McClellan was not taken by surprise in an at tack on his right wing. He foresaw it, and had prepared for it. He knew that it was the weakest part of his live, and that as it was the only cover for his communications it offered very strong temptations for an attack. His a my was not large enough to cover the whole of his long line He called over and over again for reinforcements to enable him to do so, but he could not get them. The Government had none to spare. While the rebels can concentrate their forces upon a single point we are under the fatal necessity of covering a dozen. Jackson was ravaging the Valley of the Shenandoab, and menacing Maryland and the Capital. Ewell had joined him with all his force. The Government naturally besitated about incurring a danger which came close home to it by sending away its troops to guard against one which seemed remote and doubtful. The strength of the rebels at Richmond, moreover, was studiously underrated. Predictions were freely uttered that it would vanish when approached—that their numbers would prove to be less than those of McClellau's army, and that he could very well take care of himself. All these things mands of Gen. Banks and of Gen McDowell were had their effect. They begat in the public mind an undue